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ABSTRACT 
The Indonesian armed forces played an important role in building the nation and in 
making Indonesia independent. ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or 
Indonesian Armed Forces was born as an army of national liberation, and it played an 
important role in politics from the beginning. After the failure of an attempted coup by 
the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) on 30 September 1965, Suharto, as a commander, 
brought the military fully into the political arena. ABRI became embedded in the 
government, which meant that ABRI itself became the government. Some military 
officers began to have doubts about supporting Suharto without setting limits. As a result, 
Suharto took strong action and marginalized the military from its social political role. 
ABRI as an institution lost its authority, and it became a tool for the regime instead of a 
pioneer in the development of the nation. Under Suharto we can conclude that during 
1965-1985 period, the Indonesian government could be classified as a “military regime.” 
Then, after Suharto gradually began to push the military further from direct control over 
the government, the military lost whatever autonomy it might have exercised before. This 
is important because the type of authoritarian regime influences the chances for success 
of a new democracy. Given that the military had been pushed out of many aspects of 
government policy-making, Indonesia’s new democracy should experience less civil- 
military conflict. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The political crisis that happened in Indonesia at the end of Suharto’s New Order 
government was connected with Indonesia’s economy which, along with those of many 
other South East Asia Regions, began to unravel in July 1997. The nation’s currency, the 
Rupiah, rebounded to 12,125 against the dollar after sinking to a record low of 17,000, as 
did the Jakarta stock market. As the crisis widened, it unleashed a tidal wave of misery, 
washing away the livelihood of millions, including many in the middle class. By year’s 
end, an estimated 1 million children were out of school, their parents unable to afford 
their fees. The level of joblessness and poverty increased drastically and inflation reached 
100 percent. This crisis shook Suharto’s regime, whose political legitimacy had already 
been questioned.’ 
Several incidents led to the resignation of Suharto in 21 May 1998. Among them 
were rejection by some intellectual groups of the result of the 1997 election, the monetary 
crisis, students’ refusal to accept Suharto as a candidate for his seventh term of 
presidency, student demonstrations, the shooting of students at Trisakti University, the 
13-1 5 May 1998 riots, and the student occupation of the General Assembly building on 
15 May 1998. 
There was political turmoil among the political elite anticipating the wave of 
reformation. On 18 May 1998, surprisingly, the Speaker of Indonesian Parliament 
(DPRMPR), Harmoko, held a press conference and said leaders of the various political 
factions would meet and ask the 76-year-old leader to act wisely and step down willingly. 
“Key Events of the Indonesian Crisis,” The World Bank Group, available at I 
http ://www. worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/invents.htm 
’ Ibid. 
Ironically, Harmoko was also the one who previously told Suharto that 70 percent of the 
people of Indonesia still wanted him to become president in the earlier election in 1997. 
However, Gen. Wiranto, who commanded the country's military, said the demand 
represented only the views of some individ~als.~ 
Finally, every maneuver by politicians and the military was halted when, on 21" 
May 1998, Suharto announced his resignation and appointed Vice President B.J. Habibie 
to become his successor to continue the rest of his term. At this moment, General 
Wiranto, as ABFU (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Arrned Forces of 
Republic of Indonesia) commander, made a statement that ABRI would support the 
constitution, and he would protect Suharto and his family. This historical moment 
brought about conflicting opinions in the society. Suharto's resignation and the 
procedure of taking oath of office for President Habibie were questionable on 
constitutional grounds, as was General Wiranto's statement, because at that time the 
cabinet was dismis~ed.~ 
Suharto was overthrown despite the support of General Wiranto. Why? Because 
he led a civilian authoritarian regime, which had sidelined the armed forces in favor of 
civilian sources of support. When their withdrew his support, the armed forces no longer 
had the will or the interest in propping up his regime. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is important in understanding the type of civil military relations during 
the Suharto era. The role of the military in politics is a very interesting subject to study, 
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especially in the third world countries in Asia. Indonesia is one of the countries in Asia 
whose military has had an important role in the nation. The role of Indonesian military in 
politics did not come as a result of praetorian politics nor did it develop suddenly. The 
role of the military in politics began when the republic was born. When the first civilian 
government could not stand up to the allies, the British and the Dutch, then the military 
leader took a different path. Under the supreme commander, General Sudirman, the 
existence of the republic defense entirely depended upon guerrilla war. Furthermore, the 
military involvement in non military matters was reaffirmed after the 1945 constitution 
was used again in 1950. Then, since Suharto ruled the country in the late 1960s, the 
military role in social political matters became more significant. 
It can be concluded that the military has no plan to abandon power. Surprisingly, 
both under the Suharto New Order regime and under the new democratic regime, the 
armed forces have lost power and autonomy. This thesis is important to understand the 
how this occurred. 
B. ARGUMENT 
Many observers have argued that the military in Indonesia controlled the 
government; in other words Indonesia was under a military regime. Karen L. Remmer in 
her book, Military Rule in Latin America, wrote: “Three decades of research have yielded 
little beyond a set of truisms. One truism is that military acts to protect its institutional 
interests.” If this was the case in Indonesia, we would expect the military dominate the 
policy making process to defend its interests. Based upon the theory and the discussion 
above, the question that will be posed is whether Indonesia during the period between 
1965-1998 was under a military regime or a civilian authoritarian regime? 
Under Suharto we could draw the conclusion that at a certain phase the 
Indonesian government could be classified as a “military regime.” But then, after 
Suharto’s contemporaries retired from the military, and Suharto felt that the new officers 
in the military could threaten his position, he gradually began to withdraw the military 
from direct control over the government. Suharto increasingly civilianized his military 
regime. The military lost whatever independence it might have exercised before 1965. 
The type of authoritarian regime influences the chances for success of a new 
democracy. The higher degree of militarization of the authoritarian regime would expose 
the military more saliently to emerging civilian policies, thus increasing the difficulty of 
the tran~ition.~ Thus, if Indonesia was a military regime under Suharto, we would expect 
a high degree of military resistance to democracy, particularly in the areas of defense 
policy and human rights. However, if the New Order regime was a civilian dictatorship, 
we would expect to see less military contestation under democratic rule. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The analysis will use the case study method over time to examine the president 
and the military involvement in the social and political affairs in Indonesia. I will 
examine the relative power of military in the time period, vis-a-vis the government over 
Guillermo O’Donnel, Introduction to the Latin American Cases, , ed. Guillenno O’Donnel, Phillipe C. 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, part 
11, (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pages 10-1 1. 
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time. Then I will assess who was in charge in each period. This thesis will show that the 
balance of power shifted towards Suharto by 1978. 
Data collection is based on published books and articles, newspaper reports, and 
from the Internet. 
D. CONTENT OF THE THESIS 
Chapter I - Introduction 
This section discusses the research question, importance of the subject, 
methodology, and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter I1 - Indonesian Military’s history up to 1965 
This section documents the history of how the Indonesian military expanded its 
influence in the country since the revolutionary era, the turbulent 5Os, the development of 
military doctrine (middle way, dwi fungsi/dual function) and the origins of the 1965 
coup. 
Chapter I11 - Rule by Suharto and the military 1965-1978 
This section discusses how Suharto and the military initially governed the country 
during the new order regime. The military as an institution saw themselves as the saviors 
of the nation, and they placed their members in every important position in the 
government. Suharto as the President allowed this situation to happen and encouraged it 
because he needed the military to support him. 
Chapter IV - Generational changes and military challenges to Suharto from 1978 to mid- 
1980s 
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This section examines how some idealist officers realized that the military dual 
function deviated from its original track. They had not just only begun to question the 
legitimacy of the military supporting only one political party (Golkar), but also 
challenged Suharto in many other ways as well. 
Chapter V - Suharto consolidates power mid1980s-1998 
This section analyzes Suharto’s consolidation of power after his military 
contemporaries retired, and he felt threatened by the new military officers. Officers in 
ABRI increasingly thought that Suharto’s domination in political process was not the 
ideal system for political stability. 
Chapter VI and VII - Reformation era and military new paradigm 1998-now/Conclusions 
These chapters conclude that the last period of Suharto’s regime was a civilian 
authoritarian regime. Suharto used ‘dual function’ doctrine to use ABRI to control the 
country. However, following democratization civilians are not really ready to fill the 
positions left by the military, such as in the department of defense, because many 
civilians have too little knowledge and education in defense issues. 
11. INDONESIA’S MILITARY UP TO 1965 
The Indonesian military developed political autonomy during the co~ntry’s 
struggle for independence. At that time, it did not want to limit its role only to the 
defense area. The Japanese occupation during WW I1 helped Indonesia build a strong 
military, but also brought soldiers into political life. After the Japanese surrendered in 
1945, civilian politicians still advocated cooperation with the Dutch colonial government, 
which did not satisfy military leaders, who preferred amied struggle to gain Indonesian 
freedom from the Dutch. Thus, the military pushed the leading civilian politician, 
Sukarno, to immediately announce Indonesia’s proclamation of independence. Even 
though civilian politicians did not authorize formal armed forces immediately, military 
officers built their own organizations. Moreover, the military chose its own leadership, 
overriding the choices of civilian politicians. To fight the Dutch, the military and 
civilians had different agendas. The civilians believed in political negotiation while the 
military wanted to continue to use force to achieve independence. This conflict over 
policy established a pattern of military autonomy from civilian direction. 
In this chapter, I will examine four examples of successful military resistance to 
civilian oversight. First, I will examine the declaration of independence. Then, I will 
examine civil-military conflict over the formation of Indonesian armed forces. Third, I 
will show how the TNI acted independently from political direction during the struggle 
against the Dutch in 1947 and 1948. Finally, I will show how the armed forces 
developed their own doctrine (the ABRI’s “Dual Function” or middle way), that justified 
military involvement in social and political issues. 
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A. THE PEOPLE SOLDIERS 
After more than three centuries of Dutch colonialism, Indonesia was occupied by 
Japan from March 1942 to August 1945. The Japanese played an important role in the 
future of Indonesia’s social and political life, creating various military organizations 
during their occupation of Indonesia. This situation was an important step in 
development of the Indonesian military because in the Dutch colonialist armed forces, 
Koninklij ke Nederlands-Indische Leger (KNIL) only allowed a few Indonesians to 
become officers. The highest Indonesian officers before 1940 were of the rank of Major. 
The Japanese organized various military groups like the defenders of fatherland (PETA), 
pioneer front, Seinendan, Keibodan, Heiho, and Boei, and these groups were led by local 
leaders. Thus, when the Japanese surrendered to the allies on August 15, 1945, they left 
behind several local military forces in Indonesia. These military groups, led by local 
officers unconcerned by the traditional military hierarchy, would play an important role 
in military and politics in Indonesia for the next two generations.6 
After Japan surrendered, Sukarno and Hatta, the main civilian political leaders 
proclaimed the independence of Indonesia. These leaders generally were from an “older 
generation” who had participated in politics since Dutch colonialist rule. Many nationalist 
leaders educated and trained in the West usually came frompriyayz, the traditional Java 
elite feudal group. The Japanese destroyed the authority and prestige of the priyayi by 
allowing some of the youth, most of them military members, to fill the political vacuum. 
Japanese occupation then awakened a new political generation that later become known 
as the 45 generation. 
Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces, (Singapore: 
Institute of In ternational Affairs, 1995), pages 25-26 
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On August 14, 1945, one day before the Japanese surrendered, PETA and Heiho 
disbanded. Local armed groups filled the military vacuum. These groups became the 
new Praetorian Guard. At the same time, the Japanese surrender announcement led to 
different opinions about how the proclamation of independence should be managed. The 
older generation, like Sukarno and Hatta, wanted to continue their cooperation with the 
Japanese to prevent armed conflict. On the other hand, younger leaders wanted to end 
their relationship with the Japanese. In the end, the older generation of leaders realized 
that the Japanese no longer had any authority and control, after Tokyo surrendered to the 
allies.’ 
According to Lieutenant General (ret.) Hasnan Habib, the most important thing in 
this incident was “actually the ABRI’s political role ahead from the proclamation. It was 
begin in the initiation of the declaration of independence, which happened one day before 
Indonesia independence was proclaimed by Sukamo-Hatta on behalf of the Indonesian 
people.778 
As it is explained in the book, The History of Republic of Indonesian Armed 
Forces, “before proclamation of Indonesian independence, we did not have armed 
forces.. . even in the proclamation day, our wealthy were only a small piece of paper that 
had proclamation text; more papers with constitution; the red-white flag; national anthem 
and the full spirit of feelings of freedom. Outside these five pillars, practically there was 
nothing that could be called our capital.”’ Given this attitude the future Indonesian 
Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, (Jakarta: 7 
Pusat Sejarah ABFU), Page 12, quoted in Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function, page 27. ’ Ibid. 
The Histoly of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesian, (Jakarta: Department of Information, 9 
Republic of Indonesia), p 7, quoted in Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function, page 29. 
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armed forces would take an important role in defending the independence of Indonesia, 
which had just been proclaimed. 
B. FROM INDEPENDENCE FIGHTERS TO NATIONAL SOLDIER 
Although the political leadership announced the nation’s independence on August 
17, 1945, there was no immediate plan to build formal armed forces. This was because 
the government and its leader believed that diplomacy was the best way to achieve 
freedom. On the other hand, the armed organizations and the younger generation 
believed that freedom could only be achieved by armed struggle. 
The People’s Security Agency (BKR) was established on August 20, 1945 by the 
former members of PETA and Heiho. BKR was not a military organization but an 
institution for establishing security and the people’s wealth. A national police was also 
established for defending law and order. Many armed organizations objected, and began 
to establish independent “fighter organizations.” Many student-soldiers also emerged 
during this period. As President Suharto stated on October 5,  1970, the younger 
generations felt “it did not make sense having the government without security personnel 
to defend sovereignty.” As a consequence, there were two reactions to the government’s 
policy: “some of them joined the BKR to ‘give their best effort there’ and some of them 
chose to establish their own ‘fighter institutions.””’ 
One and half months after the proclamation of independence, the government 
realized that it could not survive without national armed forces. Lieutenant General Urip 
Sumahardjo, a KNIL retired officer, was made responsible for uniting various armed 
Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-46, (Ithaca, 10 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 244. 
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organizations into the TKR. The TKR was a better military organization than BKR 
because it had hierarchy and showed good performance. This context clarified that 
“Republic of Indonesian Armed Forces was armed forces from Indonesian people, an 
established base from the people and by the people. Republic of Indonesian Armed 
Forces was created from the bottom and was not a government institution at all.” 
The outcome of battles against the allies, the British and the Dutch, showed the need for 
coordination within the armed forces. On November 1 1 , 1945, various organizations of 
armed forces held a conference, which was led by General Urip. The main goal of the 
conference was to get support and cooperation from various local commanders, 
especially from the commanders that were not under the control of TKR. The other goal 
of the conference was to develop a general strategy to defend the Republic from the 
allies. The historical decision made by the armed organizations was to choose minister of 
defense and a commander in chief. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was assigned as 
minister of defense, while Colonel Sudirman, the charismatic ex PETA commander, was 
appointed as Commander in Chief. Urip was assigned to be Sudirman’s chief of staff and 
promoted to the level of Lieutenant General. Thus, the military showed their freedom to 
manage their organization without civilian politicians involvement.’ * 
C. CIVIL-MILITARY FRICTION 
These circumstances brought about fnction between the military and the civilian 
politicians. The military did not wait for civilian authority to appoint their leaders. This 
demonstrated their political autonomy. Prime Minister Sjahrir, head of the government 
“ Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function, pages 32-33 
11 
I’ bid.  
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1991), p 44. 
Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Soedirman and the 13 
12 
Indonesian Militaly in Politics, 1945-49, 
parliament in Jakarta was not informed about the conference of the Commanders in 
Yogyakarta, so he appointed Amir Syarifuddin as Minister of Defense. This situation 
created confusion and friction between military leadership under General Sudirman and 
the Sjahnr administration. On December 18, 1945, President Sukamo formally appointed 
Sudirman as the commander in chief, but he refused to appoint Sultan as Minister of 
Defense. Thus, it was not the government who appointed the military leaders, but the 
armed forces themselves. l 2  
On February 23, 1946, the TKR was changed to Indonesian Republic Soldiers 
(TRI). However, various guerilla fighters or paramilitary units were affiliated with 
political parties, and they starting to question TRI’s authority. This connection between 
“fighters organizations” and political parties created problems. Amir Syarifuddin, a 
socialist, established the Biro Perjuungun (Office of Struggle) inside Ministry of Defense 
to solve these problems. This organization was made up to coordinate various fighter 
organizations that had various base ideologies. But, because the Minister and his 
assistant were socialist, the Biro Perjuangun slowly drifted into the control of the 
 socialist^.'^ Thus, the fragmentation inside the military could not be prevented. 
Given this challenging situation, on June 13, 1947, TRI was renamed as Indonesia 
National Soldier (TNI). Then, all regular and irregular armed forces powers were 
integrated into the national armed forces. Disagreements continued threatening the TNI 
because it was shaped from various factions such as PETA, pioneer front, Heiho, and 
various ‘freedom fighters’. 
I
The conflict between civilian and military elements worsened when Amir 
Syarifuddin became Prime Minister in 1947. The government continued to place the 
armed forces under their command in order to serve party interests. “Many had extra- 
military political loyalties and soldiers often had a stronger sense of commitment to their 
unit commander than to the army as a whole.”14 There was also ideological 
fragmentation within the parties. Therefore the military leadership began to develop its 
own ideology as bases to fight in the independence struggle.” 
On May 25, 1947, the Dutch and the Indonesian government representatives 
negotiated and the result was the Linggajati agreement; the British brokered it. The 
agreement provided for the Dutch recognition of republican rule on Java and Sumatra, 
and Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. Neither the republic nor the 
Dutch were happy with it. This agreement made Sjahrir step down and then Amir 
Sajrifuddin replaced him. 
In January 1948 Syarifuddin stepped down, as a result of the Renville agreement. 
This agreement marked the low point of republican fortunes, because it was allowed the 
Dutch to retake some part of republican rule. However, the United Nations (UN) and 
United States (USA) were involved in this agreement. On January 29, 1948, Hatta 
formed a presidential cabinet and continued the process of restructuring and reorganizing 
the armed forces. Although Sudirman was against the rationalization scheme, he 
believed that restructuring the armed forces was needed for implementation of the 
guerilla war against the Dutch. 
Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University, revised edition, 1988), 
page 27. 
The Histoly of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, (Jakarta: Department of Information, 
Republic of Indonesia), p 15, quoted in Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function, page 36. 
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1s 
There were two period of conflict between the armed forces and the Dutch. The 
first was the ‘police action’ on July 2 1, 1947 and the second was ‘police action’ on 
December 19, 1948. Both ‘police actions’ occurred after civilian politicians signed 
agreements with the Dutch, the Linggarjati and Renville accords. The Dutch were 
claiming that the republic made violations of these two agreements. For those reasons, 
the military questioned the effectiveness and capability of the civilian politicians. 
Moreover, the TNI also suppressed the communist Madiun revolt September 18, 1948.16 
After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to the Republic in November 1949, it 
resulted in an open conflict between the military and civilian politicians. The military 
was unhappy over the powers of Ali Sastroamijoyo civilian government. This was 
because the new civilian government set up a provisional constitution that undermined 
the original, 1945 constitution. Accordingly, the military protested boycotting the new 
government and consequently brought about the collapse of the Ali Sastroamijoyo 
government. This whole event was known as the “October 1952 affair.” After that time, 
position of the armed forces chief of staff was eliminated. 
D. THE FRAGMENTATION 
The long history of the Indonesian Armed Forces can be viewed as a struggle for 
integration. The internal splits within the services and between the services were caused 
by two different factors, the objective factors essential in the process of formation of the 
Armed Forces and the subjective factors originating from outside the military. The 
objective factors lie in the origin of the Anned Forces, which was a result of more or less 
William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden (edited), Indonesia a County Study, (Library of Congress, 16 
1993) 
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spontaneous action of individuals or groups of individuals. Differences in background 
like that between Dutch-military-educated, Japanese military educated and non-military- 
educated people were no serious causes for split. Differences in regional, religious and 
ethnic background have never been a problem. The more serious differences were those 
in outlook between the ex-BKR people and ex-struggle organization people, and between 
the ex-struggle organization people themselves. (Ex-members of Pesindo or Socialist 
Youth were very hostile against the Hizbullah or Moslem Youth, for instance). This 
condition was continuously intensified by the subjective factors existing in the various 
political parties, political groups or politicians whose attempts to have and increase their 
“backing” within the Armed forces started early during War of Independence 1945-1 949, 
and went on until the efforts of the special bureau of the Communist Party of Indonesia to 
recruit cadres and activists from among the military in the fifties and sixties.” These 
attempts were the main cause for the splits within the military. As soon as those 
subjective factors ceased working, the efforts to achieve integration met with more 
success. Except for the absence of strong efforts at politicizing the Armed Forces from 
outside, the reasons for the cohesion were: 
1. Success in performing the Dual Function: a. Continuous success in 
military operations b. Leading role in national life; 
2. Improved management: a. Orderly career management (tour of duty, tour 
of area promotions, etc.) b. Integrated education (Armed Forces academy, 
armed forces staff and command school); and 
3. Unified organizational structure. 
Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto, The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, (Jakarta: 17 
Pusat Sejarah ABRI), Page 69. 
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The role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in society is officially formulated under 
the name of the Dual Function. As we have seen in its historical background, the Armed 
Forces had its origins in the youthful freedom fighters of 1945, both in the BKR and in 
the fighter organizations. Out of the ethos of being freedom fighter first and a 
(professional) soldier second have come the concept of the dual function, namely the 
function of freedom fighter later broadened into the defense and security function or 
military function. The Indonesian military’s foremost interest is to increase national 
resilience and the way to do it is through national development or modernization. 
National resilience is the condition necessary to achieve the national goal as formulated 
in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, namely, ”to improve the general welfare, to 
promote intellectuality in national life and to participate in the efforts to realize a world 
order based on independence, eternal peace and social j ~ s t i c e . ~ ’ ~ ~  The socio-political 
function of Armed Forces is directed towards intensifying the acceleration of national 
development. 
In the early 1950s two events occurred which had a critical impact on the 
direction of civilian-military relations. These were the 17 October 1952 event and the so- 
called June Affair in 1955. In order to understand the background of the 17 October 
incident, one must examine the attitude of the military towards the civilian politicians 
immediately after the transfer of sovereignty. The bitter experience with the “surrender” 
of Sukarno on 18 December 1948, the cease-fire of 1949, and the powerful position of 
the civilian politicians under the new constitution were the background against which the 
affair unfolded. Moreover, most of the members of the provisional Parliament at that 
’* Ibid, page 70 
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time and some of the ministers did not belong to the groups genuinely fighting for 
independence. This is easy to understand if one recalls that the Republic of Indonesia 
post-1950 was a product of an integration between the original republic, whose capital 
was Yogyakarta, and the areas formerly under the federal states created by the Dutch. 
During the physical revolution, in order to contain the original Republic, the Dutch has 
created many states throughout Indonesia. It was to those many states, joined together 
with the original Republic to form the United States of Indonesia, that the Dutch 
transferred sovereignty at the end of 1949. But those states existed only for a very short 
period. Within a year following the transfer of sovereignty, all of them dissolved and 
merged with the Republic of Indonesia.” 
E. THE CONCEPT OF DUAL FUNCTION 
The 17 October incident, the first open conflict between the army and the civilian 
politicians in post-independence Indonesia, was sparked off by discussion in the 
provisional Parliament. The topic at hand was modernization of the army, an issue 
regarded by the army as developed by Nasution commander of the army, and T.B. 
Simatupang, the then chief-of-staff of the armed forces, was opposed by a group within 
the army. This group had close contact with President Sukamo and a group of opposition 
parliamentarians. It was really as a result of a letter sent by the leader of the latter group 
that the Parliament began to discuss the military problem.20 The army headquarters and 
several regional commanders were irritated by this discussion in Parliament. On 17 
Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York, and London: 19 
Cornell University Press, 1962), pages 58-77. 
’* A.H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol 111, (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), p. 179. 
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October 1952, the officers from army headquarters, together with some regional 
commanders, went to the Palace to see President Sukamo, asking him to assume power 
and dissolve the provisional Parliament. Sukarno did not surrender to the military 
pressure, and Nasution, as the highest-ranking officer from the army headquarters, 
resigned thereafter.21 
The visit to the Palace of the army officers, and, later, the resignation of Nasution 
were the military’s political tradition of the period before, namely during the revolution. 
As has been noted earlier, when government in the revolutionary period of Yogyakarta 
was about to rationalize the military (1 948), Sudirman, opposed to the rationalization 
plan, went to see President Sukarno to deliver his disagreement. Again, when the 
government decided to negotiate with the Dutch to end the guerilla war at the end of 
1949, Sudirman delivered his protest. And because this protest was disregarded, 
Sudirman decided to resign from his position as the commander of the armed forces. This 
decision was not carried through because Nasution persuaded Sudirman to remain in his 
position. Because of the 17 October 1952 incident, “...the overall bargaining strength of 
the army vis-a-vis everyone else in the political arena was seriously impaired.’722 And it 
was the weak bargaining position of the army that became the root of another conflict 
between the army and the government. 
On 31 July 1953, a new cabinet came into being with Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, a 
well-known leftist, as minister of defense. There were two policies of Kusuma Sumantn 
that irritated the army. The first was his open sympathy for the leftist group, which 
consisted of people who had been involved in the 1948 communist rebellion in Madiun. 
’’ Feith, The Decline, pp 246-273; Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol3, pp. 1-214. 
Feith, The Decline, p. 399. 
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The second was his policy of maintaining or even deepening the cleavage between the 
pro-and the anti-1 7 October groups. Kusuma Sumantri’s policy created disquiet among 
the army officers. 
To prevent further civilian intervention in the internal affairs of the army, the 
officers subsequently decided to organize a large meeting among them. The meeting was 
opened in Yogyakarta on 17 February 1955 and was attended by more than 250 officers. 
One of the results of that meeting was that groups, the anti as well as the pro 17 October 
affair, agreed to end their conflicts.23 Commenting on the result of the conference, 
Nasution in his memoir writes: “With the unity of the TNI, the palace [i.e., President 
Sukamo] and the parties could not again freely intervene in internal TNI pr~blems.’”~ 
In this event, Nasution was wrong. On 10 June 1955, the government decided to 
appoint Colonel Bambang Utoyo, a man of fairly low seniority as an officer, as chief of 
staff. The appointment was against the spirit of the Yogyakarta meeting, for it had been 
agreed then that seniority was an important criterion for promotion to the position of 
chief-of-staff. Bambang Utoyo initially refixed his appointment. He was sworn in on 27 
June 1955. His installation ceremony was completely boycotted by the officers from the 
army headquarters. The boycott, which later became known as the “June Affair”, was a 
blow for the cabinet.25 To one foreign observer, “The June affair could be considered to 
be the dividing line between the period when the army was mainly concerned with 
Ali Sostroamijoyo, Milestone on My Journey (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, I 3  
1979), pp. 272-273; Feith, The Decline, p. 398. 
24 Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, Vol. 111, p. 277. 
” Feith, The Decline, p. 399. 
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resisting political interference in its internal affairs and the period when it began to play 
an active role in politics.,y26 
Beginning in 1957, martial law legalized the entry of military officers into 
politics. Martial Law gave the military the opportunity to exercise more power. General 
Nasution, who had been reinstated as the army chief-of-staff in 1955, still needed a 
doctrine to justify the political role of the military in term of history and experiences. But 
a clear concept of the military’s socio-political role was not presented until General 
Nasution’s “Middle Way” speech on 12 November 1958. By this principle, Nasution felt 
he was essentially making clear the position of the army in society, namely: “. . .not just 
the ‘civilian tool’ like in the Western countries, nor a ‘military regime’ which dominates 
the state power, but as one of the many forces in society, the force for the struggle of the 
people which works together with other people’s forces.’727 
It is this “Middle Way” doctrine that launches the formal departure on the long 
journey of the dual function doctrine, which in essence legitimized the sociopolitical role 
of the military. By that time, military officers had already started to occupy many 
positions, which traditionally had been occupied by civilians. 
In the last days of guided democracy, when the PKI had already outmaneuvered 
the other political parties, and Sukarno was perceived by many as very sympathetic 
towards the communists, it was to the army that most of non-Communist Indonesia, 
26 Guy J. Parker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia, ” in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military 
in Underdeveloped Countries ”, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 1962), p. 21 1. 
” A.H. Nasution, Tonggak Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Jakarta, mimeo, 1981), p. 17. See also Daniel S. Lev, 
The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-58 (Ithaca, New York Cornell Modem 
Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, Cornell University, 1966), pages 19 1-1 92. Both quoted in Salim 
Said, Genesis of Power: General Soedirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49, (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1991), p 135-136. 
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especially the elite, looked. It was no wonder then that following the assassinations of 1 
October 1965, the army got the whole-hearted support of non-communist Indonesians to 
crush PKI as well as to depose Sukamo. 
21 
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111. RULE BY SUHARTO AND THE MILITARY 1965-1978 
The year 1965 was a time when the military truly moved beyond political 
autonomy and gained direct control over the Republic of Indonesia. After the Communist 
Party, a prominent rival of the army, was defeated, the army/military became the main 
political player in Indonesia. General Suharto was able to consolidate military power 
under his command. Following this consolidation, the military would spread their 
influence to other important state’s institutions and justify this with the new dual function 
doctrine. Indonesia at that moment could be regarded as a military dictatorship, because 
the armed forces put its persons in the key positions of almost every institution of the 
state. 
There are five instances that highlight the growing military hegemony over 
civilians in the state apparatus. First, I will examine the military role in the executive 
branch. Then, I will examine how the military received seats in the parliament, and 
influenced the legislative assembly. Third, I will examine the military’s role in the 
practical politics. Moreover, to maintain political stability the military also became 
involved in organizing society and political life. Finally, they also became one of the 
main players in the Indonesian economy, as the result of the nationalization. 
A. SUHARTO TAKES POWER 
After the failure of the coup by Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) on 30 
September 1965, the military once again was integrated into a single command structure. 
In 1966, General Suharto became minister of defense, and on 30 October 1969, all of the 
armed forces branch commands were played under him as the Chief of Command. This 
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reorganization led to the centralization of the armed forces power and eliminated the 
ministries of the army, navy, air force, and police. Thus, Suharto succeeded in bringing 
the military into the political arena. With resulting centralization of power, the military 
was able to implement any kind of order from the authoritarian ruler. Furthermore, the 
police became the fourth branch of the armed forces, which further added to the 
centralization of state power. With this new structure, ABRI could interfere easily in the 
domestic political affairs.28 
Legal bases were established to strengthen and legitimize General Nasution’s 
concept of the “middle way.” One implication of ABRI’s new social-political role was to 
assign officers to the government agencies, institutions, committees, and organizations. 
In the beginning of the New Order, their assignment was intended to monitor the 
Indonesians for Communist influence. This mission later changed to a focus on the 
nation’s development. 
B. ABRI IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
ABRI’s part in the new order began in 1966, after General Suharto was promoted 
to chief of the cabinet presidium and also held the position as first minister of defense. 
General Nasution became speaker of the temporary peoples’ parliament (MPRS). ABRI 
was actively involved in beginning the new order, and in the h l l  effort to recover from 
the communist rebellion of 1965. At that time, political instability and economic crisis 
converged. Interestingly, at that time, the entry of ABRI into politics was not because the 
army struggled to get power from civilians and political parties, but because of the 
’’ BiIveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual Function, p. 103. 
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weakness of the civilian political parties. In addition, ABRI’s political role in this crisis 
situation was meant to fill a vacuum in the bureaucracy. 
The events of 1965-1966 substantially changed the character of the political 
system. One significant outcome of the new political role of ABRI was the establishment 
of the Operation for Security and Order Recovery Command or Kopkamtib. With this 
institution, ABRI’s political role became wide, not only limited in political matters, but 
also including ideology, economy, and c~lture.’~ 
Previously, military involvement in non-military matters had been to maintain the 
development of the nation. But now ABRI’s appointments in civilian positions were 
meant to manage the political dynamics of the republic, which then expanded into 
society. As a result, it was not surprising that there were so many military personnel 
placed in the civilian position. For instance, in the government, some military 
appointments were as members of the cabinet, ambassadors, and governors. In the 
regions, military people replaced the chiefs of districts, not only in the sensitive districts 
but also in the relatively stable ones. For example, Central Java, Lampung, West 
Kalimantan, and North Sulawesi were relatively stable regions that had ABRI governors. 
Although these regions were relatively stable, some had political and economical 
importance from ABRI’s point of view. ABRI domination among the governors made 
ABRI the decision-maker at the center and in the regions. As a result, promotions 
throughout the bureaucracy depended on the ABRI leader’s agreement. Permits 
contracts, and decisions upon projects required ABRI approval or, in other words, had to 
be coordinated with ABRI. Consequently, popular aspirations and goals were 
29 Ibid., pages 104-105; Harold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pages 222-223. 
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subordinated to ABRI’s. Moreover, ABRI appointments to bureaucratic positions were 
often done without competitive ~election.~’ 
C. ABRI IN THE PARLIAMENT 
By the end of the 1960s, the political parties reached a compromise favoring 
adoption of a system of balanced representation as an exchange from single district as 
suggested by army. As a concession, the army was guaranteed to get 100 seats in the 
parliament. When General Jusuf became minister of defense, ABRI launched a civil 
mission. In part, this program was meant to answer the criticism that the bond between 
ABRI and the people was being eroded by military arrogance. In addition, the civil 
mission was meant to enhance ABRI’s image and to strengthen it organizationally by 
giving it roots in the society. 
ABRI’s involvement in social organizations in the new order began when ABRI 
became involved in forming Golkar as a new political power in 1964. Golkar was 
formed, however, because at that time the political parties were considered to be a source 
of conflict and political instability. In that respect, the political parties’ record in 
government was considered bad and could not be repeated. Also, to support new 
economic ideas, a new order government needed nonpartisan groups to carry on its 
programs. In this regard, Golkar was expected to become a locomotive for the new order 
government. In the past, ABRI also formed mass organizations affiliated with ABRI 
institution, such as MKGR, Soksi, and Kosgoro. The purpose of forming mass 
organizations was to balance communist affiliated organi~ations.~’ 
Indria Samego, Li.. . BiIa ABRI Menghendaki”, pages 107-1 12 




D. ABFU IN EVERY DAY POLITICS 
When Suharto came to power in mid 1960s, he relied to a very considerable 
extent on a group of advisers drawn from the army. In the mid-l970s, four of most 
important members of the “inner core group” were Yoga Sugama, Ali Murtopo, Sudomo, 
and Benny Murdani. These men enjoyed close relations with the president more as 
individuals than as a group. Suharto’s loyal officers predominated with an intelligence 
and security background. Three of the four men on whom Suharto depended came from 
the intelligence and security field. This dominance of intelligence and security officers 
reflected and reinforced Suharto’s preoccupation with a “security and development” 
approach to nation building. All the key pillars of Suharto’s rule were headed by his 
loyalists, and these officers might be described as “military pragmatists.” They saw the 
enhancement or at least maintenance of the new order as essential to the military’s 
dominant position in society. They took the view that Indonesian society was still in 
transition. Such efforts were invariably taken in the name of upholding the principles of 
the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The pragmatists took the view that the end 
justified the means. In order to achieve the desired results--a stable and prosperous 
Indonesia--the intelligence services had to manipulate the political process. 32 
The government was able to count on the loyalty of its own administrative 
structure, in particular on the Departments of Defense and Home Affairs, to ensure that 
the elections were a success. This gave it an advantage over its political opponents. 
Ostensibly, these two departments were “the neutral organizers and guardians of an open 
j2 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983, (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University, 1984), p 19-23. 
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electoral process.” In practice, they acted in a most partisan fashion. The ministers of 
defense and home affairs were team members of Suharto’s inner circle, who were 
members of the control board of Golkar. This type of organization reached down into 
almost every village and had an all-pervasive influence on Indonesian political life. The 
most important element of these instruments of control and influence was the army’s 
territorial structure. The commander of each regional military command (Kodam) 
oversaw a territorial organization, which was considered as important as any other 
organization under them. 
Under the Kodam commanders were a number of military resort commands 
(Korem). These generally corresponded to the old position of residency in the civilian 
administrative structure. One step below and corresponding generally with regency was 
the military district command (Kodim). At another level below an equivalent to the sub 
district was the military sub districthayon command (Koramil). Below the Koramil was 
an NCO (Non Commissioned Officer) who, together with two or three men, represented 
the army at the village level. Under this system, there was an equation, even at the 
village level, between the army territorial structure and the civilian administrator. The 
interaction between the military officers in the territorial administration and officials in 
the Home Affairs hierarchy was very close. Thus a military man serving as provincial 
governor kept in close touch with the local military commander. A regent coordinated 
with the local Kodim commander. This structure gave the army leaders a great capacity 
to influence the outcome of general elections. In most cases, if the village head came out 
for Golkar, he could often deliver the whole village to the ruling group. The suggestions 
of local military officials were backed up by the suggestions and inducements to the 
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civilian officers. Prior to 1978, the military commander was nearly always chairman of 
Golkar’s regional control board, and also chairman of the regional functional affairs 
board. In this capacity, he was able to select those officers and NCOs who would serve 
as a regent, sub district officers, and village head in his domain. In his further capacity as 
chairman of the provincial leadership council, the military commander had all manner of 
supporting powers and could if necessary issue instructions to the governor, the police 
chief and the public p r o s e c ~ t o r . ~ ~  
E. ABRI ECONOMIC ROLE 
ABRI’s part in the economy b gan when th ountry faced an emergency 
situation, when ABRI personnel, during the Parliamentary Democracy era (1949-1959) 
received the order to take over or nationalize foreign Dutch companies in 1958-1959. The 
assignment was to secure the companies from workers most of whom were members of 
SOBSI or the Communist-affiliated Indonesian Central Organization of Labor. To 
overcome SOBSI, army leader Ahmad Yani supported the forming of SOKSI, the 
organization to mute the communist SOBSI, which was led by Major Suhardiman. Both 
military figures discussed the matter and aseed to reactivate anti-communist military 
personnel who were involved in the PRRWermesta effort to suppress the Indonesian 
Communist Party or PKI.~‘ 
At the beginning of the new order, ABRI’s involvement in the economic matters 
was meant to get sustained financial resources for the army without disturbing state 
finances. Therefore, army officers were stationed in many national company sectors, 
j3 Ibid., pages 42-50. 
j4 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital: North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986, page 251 
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which considered their needs. The national oil company, Pertamina, was one of the 
nationally owned companies used by the army to get cash. In the 1960s, income from the 
oil sector was one third of the country’s income. Moreover, after the rise in oil price in 
the world in 1973-1974, the income from oil export was two-thirds of the total export 
income at the time. Although Pertamina was a nationally owned company, it was 
virtually a private company under Major General Ibnu Sutowo’s management and 
responsible only to ABRI’s leader. It was true that he was formally responsible to the 
Ministry of Mining, but he had full autonomy. In 1975, when Pertamina could not pay its 
short-term debt the foreign countries--valued around 1.5 billion dollars--Ibnu Sutowo’s 
autonomy was challenged. Other nationally owned companies, ruled by ABN, included 
the National Logistics Board ( B ~ l o g ) . ~ ~  
Even though the military’s superiority over the government was unchallenged, 
there were signs that the position of the group of ‘politic’ and ‘financial’ generals 
apparently was declining. Whenever a general of 1945 generation who had fought as 
guerrilla against the Dutch reached retirement, an officer of the new generation with an 
academic background was promoted from middle-level positions. These middle-level 
position officers often had embraced military professional ideals. Even though many of 
them had inherited the older generation’s values, some of them realized that chasing 
commercial necessity would compromise people and the nation and would stimulate 
political challenges toward the military in the future. Although some of these officers 
tended to deal with popular dissatisfaction through repressive actions, others tended to 
cooperate with civilian technocrats within the government in order to develop good 
Harold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, pages3 10-3 15. 35 
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administration important to economic development. There was only a small possibility 
that the military officers would implement changes in the social program for the sake of 
the people, but the hope for limited reformation could not be avoided. The unit 
commanders had to deal with the increasing dissatisfaction of the people resulting from 
the actions of the ‘politic and financial’ generals.36 
Some military men believed that the military dual function had gone too far, and 
they asked for reform of ABRI’s dual function. According to them, there were 
distortions in implementing the dual function concept. The dual function had 
systematically shut down the political process in Indonesia and made the political parties 
dependent on the government. These officers attended seminars, making assignments in 
favor of focusing the dual function concept on the people’s interests, and not simply on 
the government’s or the ruler’s. Of course to make their idea happen, they would meet 
criticism and opposition from their colleagues, those favoring the status quo, and even 
from the president himself, as the ABRI’s supreme commander. 37 
F. CONCLUSION 
The era of 1965 to 1978 was known as the era of the military superiority with the 
support of Suharto as the president. Implementation of dual function, especially the 
political role, involved the military deeply in social and political matters and ended up 
strengthening the economic and political position of Suharto. This era was marked by the 
emphasis on the security approach over the prosperity approach without regard for the 
peoples’ aspirations. Anyone who had a different opinion from the government or ABRI 
j6 Ibid., pages 398-399 
David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, page 99. 37 
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could easily be accused of opposing development and Pancasila. They could also be 
accused of subversion and communist influence. As a consequence, the government and 
ABRI easily put sanctions without judicial process on people who differed from the 
approach of the government or ABRI. The limitation of peoples’ political aspirations and 
the stagnation of civilian careers arose from a security approach that had gone too far. 
This situation and conditions did not promote civil society or its participation in 
government. 
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IV. GENERATIONAL CHANGES AND MILITARY 
CHALLENGES TO SUHARTO 1978-MID 1980s 
The heyday of the military in Indonesia’s political life was from 1966 until late 
1978, after which it started to decline and its relationship with Suharto decreased. 
Apparently, he pushed the military aside and kept the power only for himself. Suharto 
was proving that he was in full control of the military by ignoring them and even starting 
to civilianize his government and to put only military loyalists in important positions 
rather than military professionals. Not all of the military professionals liked the way 
Suharto and some of his loyalists led the nation; in fact, they began to question ABRI’s 
dual function. ABRI’s ‘Dual Function’ had been distorted and had deviated from its 
original meaning. Because it led the military to go too far with its intervention in social 
political and economic matters. Furthermore, as the result of generational change in the 
military, some of the new officers preferred professionalism instead. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the debate about ABRI’s dual function 
among the military officers, civilian, and Suharto himself during the 1978-mid-1980s. I 
will also examine how some officers started to challenge Suharto over his uses of the 
military to keep his power. Finally, I will examine how Suharto managed the challenge 
from these officers and remained in control of the military. 
A. CHALLENGING ABRI’S DUAL FUNCTION 
At the time of the 1977 general elections, there were conflicting views within the 
armed forces about the military role in the electoral process. The military pragmatists, 
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Suharto’s loyalists, wanted to take steps to ensure a successful election and maintenance 
of stability. They especially wanted to help Golkar (the ruling party) to win the election. 
Other officers believed that if ABRI backed up Golkar, it would be contradictory to the 
doctrines of the late General Sudirman that the armed forces were not the property of any 
one group of the society but of the nation as a whole. 
In February 1978, Colonel Abdulkadir Besar, a close friend of General (retired) 
Nasution, released a “SESKOAD (Army Command and Staff College) Paper” about 
ABRI ‘Dual Function’ doctrine. He put Indonesia’s civil-military relationship in a 
unique position. The bases of his view was cultural values, with every member of the 
family responsible for the family welfare. Thus, a member of Indonesia Armed Forces 
(ABRI) would be not only responsible for the defense problems, but also for the 
economics, culture, and politics of the nation. He also stressed that ABRI could not adopt 
a partisan perspective. He reminded “We can indeed imagine the dangers (of) an armed 
force participating in politics along with other social forces which are unarmed.”38 
Beside the “SESKOAD Paper,” in January 1978 a TNI (Indonesia National 
Soldier) studies and communication forum (or FOSKO-TNI) was declared, which had 
many retired generals as members. FOSKO-TNI released a “Work Paper” that 
expressed their views about ‘Dual Function’. Furthermore, on May 20, 1978, a work 
paper, which was titled ‘‘7“ and its Dual Function,” had been sent to the Army Chief of 
Staff, General Widodo. The paper gave a recommendation: even though the concept of 
‘Dual Function’ is logically reasonable in certain national struggles, ‘Dual Function’ has 
to be reconsidered and reevaluated. In general, the “FOSKO-TNI paper” and 
David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 64. 58 
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“SESKOAD Paper” were similar. These papers recommended that the concept and 
application of the ‘Dual Function’ should be reevaluated, and ABRI has to stand for 
every group and not take sides for any single group. 
On September 14, 1978, FOSKO-TNI released another work paper; the title is 
“Functional group and its problems.” This paper urged ABRI to withdraw its active 
support for GOLKAR (the ruling party). Moreover, in the year 1979, the Army Chief of 
Staff, General Widodo, also released the “Widodo Paper.” Besides addressing the ‘Dual 
Function’ debate this paper predicted the ABRI would withdraw from executive 
government.39 It also predicted a decrease of ABRI participation in non-military 
activities, and an increase in civilians in executive government. It argued that ABRI’s 
only consideration should be to make sure that any party who was in power had to 
develop the country on the 1945 constitution and Pancasila bases. If the governing party 
obstructed these principles, ABRI would take action against them. 
The Minister of Defense and Security/Amed Forces Commander in Chief, 
General Jusuf, appointed in March 1978, also emphasized the importance of the people 
and ABRI being unified. He also called on ABRI to soften its ‘Dual Function’ mission. 
He advised military officials to be fair in the relationship with the political parties. In 
April 1979, he clarified his attitude toward dual function by releasing a statement that 
ABRI is not a protector of a single group in the society but protector of all groups in the 
society. In February 1979, the Minister of Defense announced that ABRI mostly would 
not interfere in political parties, even decreasing its influence toward Golkar. In July 
Dwi Fungsi ABRI (Konsep 1979), (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Markas Besar 39 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Angkatan Darat, 1979) Cited from Bilveer Singh, Dwi Fungsi ABRI: The Dual 
Function, p. 162. 
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1979, Jusuf was asked whether the military had not “gone too far” with the dual hnction. 
“I would not use the term ‘going too far,”’ he answered, “but we should be much more 
m~derate.”~’ All political parties including Golkar appreciated this action. 
Along with the “SESKOAD Paper”, “FOSKO-TNI Papers,” “Widodo Paper,” and 
General Jusuf announcements, many retired Generals started to openly criticize ‘Dual 
Function.’ Lt. General (retired) Ali Sadikin, the former Governor of Jakarta, repeated his 
statement that ABRI’s policy is to protect Pancasila and 1945 constitution. Another 
retired general, General Soemitro, former Commander of Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), said there is a need to change the 
relationship between ABRI and other social political groups, including the placement of 
ABRI’s personnel on non-military duty. He also asked ABRI to go back to its original 
role and, if possible, to correct the mistakes that they made previously. 
B. SUHARTO’S REACTION 
As a reaction to the criticism to the dual function, on March 27, 1980, in the 
Armed forces commander meeting in Pekanbaru, President Suharto attacked his critics. 
He said: “before the new order was born, we saw and sensed that our national ideology 
was submerged by various existing ideologies, whether it was Marxism, Leninism, 
Communism, Socialism, Marhaenism (movement to fight for the interests of the have- 
nots under former president Sukarno), Nationalism, or religi~n.”~’ In order to prove their 
superiority, they made endless rebellions. From this situation arose the new order 
Quoted in David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 139. 
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government. The determination of new order was to make a total correction of the drift 
away from Pancasila and 1945 constitution. According to Suharto, there was a certain 
“party or group that does not yet trust Pancasila 100 percent” and “as long as we could 
not succeed in bringing [this group] to their senses we must always step up our vigilance, 
choose partners, fnends who are truly defend Pancasila have no doubts whatsoever in 
P a n ~ a s i l a . ” ~ ~  For these reasons, Suharto announced that ABRI had to “select friends that 
will support the Pancasila” and declared that ABRI and Golkar could not separate; then, 
it was a clear statement that ABRI have to support Golkar in the next election. 
Suharto also worried about the groups that wanted to change the 1945 
constitution. He said in Pekanbaru that if two-thirds of the members of MPR wanted to 
change the constitution, then it was ABRI’s duty to use ‘their weapons’ to stop them. 
But, “instead of using their weapons to change of the 1945 constitution and Pancasila, it 
is better to kidnap one person from the two-third members who want to make the change, 
because with two third members minus one, it is illegal according to the 1945 
c o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ’ ~ ~ ~  
After Suharto’s speech, “HANKAM (Department of Defense and Security) 
Paper” had been prepared, to strike back the paper’s critics. The purpose of the 
“HANKAM Paper” was to state that dual function had to continue and to strengthen it. 
This paper showed that ABRI’s grip in the high political and military systems would not 
change. Nevertheless, “HANKAM Paper” in some senses accommodates the critics of 
dual function. The paper agrees that ABRI has to give up some civilian jobs and be more 




Suharto made a comment about this paper, “In principle, ‘Dual Function’ has to be 
continued, but it has to improve its application in a better way.”44 
As we look at this, in the beginning of the 80s, there was some debate within 
ABRI about dual function. There were two dominant positions, the first was a group of 
Generals who believed that ABRI had to use a lower profile approach, give up some of 
its positions and privileges, and stand neutral in national politics. Second was a group 
favoring the status quo, who believed from experience that the professional approach 
would not be good for the country. For this group, ABRI had to be fully involved in dual 
function implementation; ABRI could not be neutral in the nation’s politics, and for of 
this reason ABRI had to co-operate with various partners within the society. After 
Suharto’s speech in Pekanbaru, this group had dominant position in the government. 
C. THE GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN ABRI 
By the mid 1980s, the Suharto’s military colleagues from the 1945 generation 
retired, and new leaders, educated in the professional military academy, took over their 
positions. Some of these officers had a number of core principles: the stability of the 
nation was the first priority, and any threats to national unity must eliminated at all costs. 
The loyalists used these principles as to secure the position of Suharto and keep him in 
power. But other military officers already had doubts about supporting Suharto without 
limits. Furthermore, they shared the opinion that Suharto’s domination in the political 
process was not conducive to political stability, economic development, and national 
@ David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p 170. 
38 
unity. These officers were preoccupied with several issues that might bring about 
national disintegration. 
There issues included: the wide gap between the poor and the rich, politicization 
Islam religion, collusion, corruption, nepotism, and anti-Chinese sentiment. They 
believed that Suharto was not really trying to solve these matters; furthermore, he might 
have contributed to these problems. Although many retired generals expressed these 
concerns openly, active duty officers were not so brave. These active duty officers feared 
they would not only lose their jobs, but there might be possibilities that they would 
treated as dissidents as well. “The feeling in ABRI that Suharto has to go is widespread,” 
said Lieutenant General (ret.) Hasnan Habib, a former ambassador to the US. “Even 
younger officers like Colonel and Lieutenant Colonels share this 
Despite of his abuse of power, Suharto still received respect from the military. In 
the new order period, the military as an institution had served him willingly. Suharto 
himself was a military man, and he was rescuing Indonesia fi-om economical and political 
chaos. Under his presidency, no big tensions arose from ethnicity and religion that could 
threaten national unity. Moreover, after it had experienced factional competition for 
power under former President Sukarno, ABRI under the new order was relatively unified. 
For many, the most important thing was that the officers who were really loyal to Suharto 
and satisfied him would get a prosperous life, wealth, position and protection from any 
accusations made by civil society.46 
45 Adam Schwarz, quotation, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), p 282. 
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D. ABRI SIDELINED 
There are several reasons why the relationship between the military and Suharto 
declined in the mid-1980s. One was that Suharto moved some economic power from 
ABRI to his Chinese hends and to his family as well. He felt that he was safer if 
Indonesian businesses were under his full command, since he knew that his Chinese 
friends and his family would not dare to betray him because they were totally dependent 
on his power. The end of the booming of oil prices also required significant economic 
reform, raising the stature of civilian economic ‘technocrats.’ Suharto kept restraining 
ABRI’s influence over their budget. To spend more than $200,000 required cabinet 
secretariat consent, thus, all major economic activity within ABRI was under control of 
members of the economic board council. These situations shifted some power fi-om the 
military to technocrats, conglomerates, and Suharto’s children. Although there were still 
important positions left to military officers, it was obvious that the military had begun to 
lose their grip.47 
The other factor that weakened the relationship between the military and Suharto 
was that Suharto did not really need military support anymore. Many times, Suharto 
showed that he could disregard military political opinions. In 1988, Suharto ignored the 
military’s strongly-worded advice and picked Sudharmono to be his vice-president. 
Sudharmono actively reduced ABRI’s political influence by undermining their financial 
strength and influence over government bureaucracy. He maintained his access to 
Suharto and set up civilian patronage through appointments to the bureaucracy and 
contracts for the business community. Furthermore, Suharto continued to reduce ABRI’s 
Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, (St Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p 21 1. 41 
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position in his cabinet, and if there were still some military officers there, only a few held 
an important position. Some analysts said that Suharto wanted to show other political 
groups that he did not rely on ABRI’s power to keep his power and rule the country. At 
this point, everybody realized that Suharto was the only power in Indonesia that could 
control and disregard every group in the Indonesian politics. 
Many ABRI’s officers were dissatisfied with the current situation. One retired 
General state: “Only Suharto has the power to get anything done in Indonesia.” And 
“ABRI is very weak, and subservient to Suharto. We just implemented what he wanted 
us to do,” said Lieutenant General (ret.) Hasnan Habib. Sayidiman Suryohadiproyo, 
another retired General said, “Suharto no longer listens to anyone, not ABRI nor anyone 
else. This is the danger we are fa~ing.’’~’ Although it could not be seen in ABRI’s overt 
stances, ABRI fought back against Suharto’s policie~.~’ 
Gradually, ABRI was side lined. Their role was increasingly defined as 
protecting the interests of the state rather than the nation. Many officers were concerned 
that close identification with Suharto was distancing the ABRI as an institution away 
from the community. They felt ABRI should be closer to the people, rather than maintain 
close relation to Suharto and play an important role in his military praetorian regime. 
They demanded that ABRI position itself above party politics and alongside the people. 
Although Suharto’s leaving office was desirable, sudden political change could pose a 
threat to stability. 
Thus, the military’s plan was to persuade Suharto to step down gradually and 
allow his vice president to continue his term. This plan led the military to nominate their 
Quoted in Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, page 284 




own candidate to become vice president, which would ensure effective control of the 
state. This effort was successful, but the military made a miscalculation about Suharto’s 
feelings about leaving office and giving it to his vice president. After the military 
succeeded putting its man in the position of vice president, Suharto still served his full 
term in office. Furthermore, Suharto accepted another term and chose as his possible 
successor B.J. Habibie, a civilian technocrat. 
E. CONCLUSION 
There was some disagreement between the military and Suharto in the 1978 to 
mid-1980s era. Some of these officers were marked as dissidents. They had bad 
experiences in business and financial matters and in their professional jobs as well. All 
those in power had shared with Suharto the feeling that the sidelined generals were driven 
by envy. They approved in Suharto’s position because they believed that most of them 
would do the same if they were in his position. 
However, Suharto and his loyalists generals had the view that military 
involvement in government had to decrease, to be replaced by civilians. However, 
Suharto selected only his loyalists, cronies, or even his family to replace the military 
officers in the bureaucracy, ruling party (Golkar), and other important positions. 
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V. SUHARTO CONSOLIDATES POWER MID 1980s-1998 
After Suharto felt that one of his sources of power, the military as an institution, 
did not unanimously support him, he began to consolidate his power on an alternative 
basis. He removed military officers who disagreed with him and put only his loyalists or 
his cronies and family in important social and political positions. Moreover, Suharto 
built a new pillar to support his regime, the Moslem groups, which had strong influence 
in the society, and he asked his protdgd, B.J. Habibie, to form an organization to provide 
leadership for them. He urged all his supporters to join in this organization and 
influenced society to accept the organization as the legitimate representative of Moslems. 
As a result, the military lost influence and only become his tool to implement his policies. 
This chapter shows how Suharto disregarded and ignored the military by not 
favoring their policies. He also created a new pillar for supporting his power, organized 
Islam, and asked Habibie to establish the organization to lead it. Moreover, he 
reorganized the ruling party, Golkar, to fulfill his requirements. I will examine also how 
Suharto put his family and cronies in other important places, where they could support 
him. Finally, I will examine how Suharto, who held very strong power in his hands, 
could possibly be overthrown by student demonstrations. 
A. UNFAVORABLE ABRI 
ABRI was very displeased with Suharto when he chose Sudharmono, chairman of 
the ruling party, Golkar, as his vice president for the 1988-93 term. Murdani, 
Commander in Chief of ABRI at that time, was strongly opposed to Suharto’s decision to 
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choose Sudharmono, and he got the consequences from what he had done. Suharto 
removed him from the position as Commander in Chief of ABRI, and reassigned him as 
Minister of Department Defense and Security, a position that was less powerful than the 
previous position. Murdani also convinced his successor, General Try Sutrisno, to take 
action within ABRI and make the announcement that ABRI nominated Sutrisno to 
become Vice President. But Sutrisno did not dare to do what his senior advised him, 
possibly because at that time he was still new in his position. The military also spread the 
rumor that Sudhannono was a member of the organization affiliated to the Indonesian 
Communist Party to stop his rise to the position of Vice President. The military 
continued to fight against Sudharmono, who was more a civilian figure than a military 
one. It placed military representatives in some two-thirds of Golkar’s provincial 
chairmanships. The military succeeded in their mission to replace Sudharmono in his 
position as the Golkar Chairman and put Lieutenant General (ret.) Wahono in the 
position. Wahono was known as a Suharto loyalist but did not have ambitions for power. 
Thus, it was not a real victory for ABRI because this outcome might be good for Suharto 
as well, since he did not like ambitious people working under his command.50 
B. INSUBORDINATION 
In 1989, inside the legislative assembly, some members of the parliament that 
came from ABRI’s faction started a debate on political openness. Although there was no 
proof of direct involvement of the military in this matter, it was obvious that some 
elements of military were looking to change Indonesia’s political system. Suharto was 
Adam Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, pages 273-274. 50 
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very displeased with this “insubordination.” Major General Sembiring and Major 
General Samsudin were replaced and Brigadier General Roekmini was not re-appointed 
in 1992. They were all ABRI representatives in the legislative a~sembly.~‘ 
The “limited battle” between military and Suharto continued. Both of them were 
preparing for the next party and national elections. Under Wahono, it was not surprising 
that Golkar electoral support decreased. Many reasons caused the decline, but some of 
the fundamental reasons were: Tommy’s, Suharto’s son, clove business that hurt an 
important group of voters, the clove farmers, and the success of the Indonesia Democratic 
Party (PDI), which employed Sukarno’s children in their campaign. But many of the 
political elite believed that military had been involved in the result. 
As the people’s assembly approached in March 1993, two factions within Golkar 
fought silently for the position of vice president. One of the factions supported B.J 
Habibie and the other supported Try Sutrisno. At this point, nobody was sure who 
Suharto would choose to accompany him for the 1993-98 presidential term as Vice 
President. Many believed that Suharto might favor Sutrisno. Sutrisno was a former 
Suharto adjutant, and he was also close to Suharto’s children. On the other hand, Suharto 
might also favor his Minister of Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie. Everybody 
knew that Suharto was really pleased with Habibie. Many strategic industries were given 
to Habibie, even the industries that previously belonged to the military like the Army 
Industry Center (PINDAD), National Aircraft Industry (IPTN), and Naval Shipyard 
(PAL).52 
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A few weeks before the assembly began, ABRI took a big step nominating 
Sutrisno for Vice President. This action was a fait accompli against Suharto and backed 
him into a comer, because he had not made his own decision yet. Some analysts said this 
action had been taken because ABRI feared that they would not succeed in convincing 
Suharto to choose Sutrisno. They predicted that Suharto would step down before 
finishing his 1993-98 term, which later proved incorrect. ABRI was afraid that it might 
be possible for Suharto to choose Habibie or retain Sudharmono in his position. Other 
factions gradually gave their support to Sutrisno’s nomination. Although Suharto 
accepted this nomination, it was clear that he was unhappy with ABRI. Suharto retaliated 
by dropping some military members from their current positions.53 
C. THE DISAGREEMENT CONTINUES 
Another arena that showed the limited battle between ABRI and Suharto was the 
election for the Chairman of Golkar. Although ABN dominated the positions of the 
Golkar chairmen provincially, its influence was doubtful, since the real power in Golkar 
was Suharto. Suharto, as head of Golkar’s patronage, had very powerful influence that 
could appoint every position in the party, even dismissing the whole organization. 
Suharto let B.J. Habibie manage the Golkar congress, disregarding all views from the 
party’s delegates, and choose a civilian candidate, Harmoko as its leader. Harmoko, a 
politician who had a popular reputation as a flatterer, had long served as Minister of 
Information. Then, ABRI’s entire list of candidates failed to achieve prestigious 
positions inside Golkar. However, just because Golkar was under Harmoko, a civilian, it 
Adam Schwarz, Nation in Waiting, page 286 5; 
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did not mean there would be more democracy in Golkar or in the country. Around 45 of 
the new members of executive board were Suharto loyalists, including his children. 
Suharto’s daughter became the Vice-chairman and his son became party treasurer of 
Golkar. 
Major General Sembiring commented on Golkar’s elections in this period, 
“Golkar could not win elections without ABRI’s support, Habibie and Harmoko were 
only Suharto’s puppet and would swept aside when he was not in control, and ABRI 
would not give up the presidency to civilian.”54 The bottom line of Sembiring’s 
statement was his disappointment with Suharto, who ignored ABRI suggestions 
regarding the nomination of Golkar’s chairman. 
ABRI gradually lost its influence in economics and politics to Suharto. Instead, 
Habibie got more power from Suharto to run his own government department and 
Golkar. Habibie even had a disagreement with ABRI when the government decided to 
purchase 39 vessels from the former East German Navy. The vessels were worn out, 
technologically obsolete, and they would cost more than new ones. The disagreement 
was not only about the condition of the vessels, but about Habibie taking authority from 
the Department of Defense and ABRI headquarters over their budget and policies. 
Moreover, Habibie also had a mandate for defense and security considerations in his big 
project in Natuna Island.55 
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D. SHIFTING POWER 
In early 199Os, Suharto felt that pressure from the reformers and their ABRI 
sympathizers had increased. Therefore, Suharto made an effort to associate his regime 
with Moslem organizations that had been previously shunted aside by government. 
Suharto knew that these organizations had loyal and strong mass bases. Thus, the 
numerous Moslems that had been demobilized before would now be remobilized. 
Moreover, even though Suharto did not come from a good Moslem family, he went to 
Mecca on pilgrimage. He undertook pilgrimage with a lot of publicity to gain sympathy 
from Moslems. Furthermore, he asked Habibie to organize the Indonesia Moslem 
Intellectual organization (ICMI) and open a Moslem bank. These actions certainly made 
the military uncomfortable, fearing the politicization of Moslem society.56 Thereafter, 
Suharto asked Habibie to give him some advice to put some ICMI’s fellows in the 
government and ABRI. Suharto appointed a General who affiliated with Islam as 
Commander in Chief ABFU (C in C> replacing the previous reformist Commander. He 
also appointed another Moslem as Army Chief of Staff, replacing the previous General, 
who had thought that Suharto had held power for too long.57 
The new Commander in Chief reorganized Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), 
which had great influence in previous times, reduced its influence and renamed it the 
ABRI Intelligence Agency (BIA). He also replaced its chief with an officer who had pro- 
Islamic orientation. While the C in C replaced some of the ABRI’s headquarter 
personnel with his fellow Moslems, the Army Chief of Staff also did the same thing in 
the Army. Moreover, he broke the ABRI’s doctrine of neutrality regarding political 
56 Jbid., page 36. 
Ibid., pages 189-190 and 199. 57 
parties by wearing Golkar’s yellow jacket when the party held rallies. Many political 
analysts argued that his behavior was caused by Suharto’s concern over the decline of 
ABRI’s support for Golkar and indicated that ABFU would be subordinated to Golkar. 
Many ABRI officers were shocked with the Army Chief of Staffs actions, but they could 
not do anything because of his close relation with Suharto’s daughter, who was one of the 
Golkar Chairmen.58 
One of the main reasons why Suharto could easily control the military was 
because he was able to develop patronage loyalties among some officers. It was well- 
known during this time that officers who had very good careers must have come fiom 
certain positions, such as adjutant or presidential guard, who served near the president. 
Thus, Suharto continued to shape the military to protect his interests. 
E. SUHARTO’S FAMILY ECONOMIC EMPORIUM 
The government’s policy of economic deregulation after 1983 made it possible 
for Suharto’s family to conquer many very profitable areas for their business. They 
achieved some monopolies from the new deregulation, using some nationalist and social 
interest arguments to justify it. They argued that these monopolies were a transfer of 
business from the Chinese to the indigenous people, which they have presented. Actually 
their involvement was worsening the Indonesian economy. For instance, Suharto’s 
youngest son was in charge of a monopoly on the sale and distribution of cloves. The 
main purpose of the monopoly was to protect the fanner from the buyers, the big 
cigarette companies, who used intimidation to lower prices. But the agency, which was 
’* Ibid., pages 21 1-212. 
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running this monopoly, made the situation worse. The floor for the price for the cloves 
was lowered, but the selling price to cigarette companies stayed high, aIlowing the 
agency to profit.” 
Suharto was very displeased about criticism of his family’s involvement in 
business. Although the situation was highly critical for the nation’s stability, few 
government officials dared to raise this issue with Suharto. Benny Murdani, Commander 
in Chief of Armed Forces, was one of the officials who tried, but he paid the 
consequences. He made the mistake of challenging Suharto’s favorite for the Vice 
Presidency, Sudharmono, and complaining about Suharto’s unrestrained greed of his 
children in the business.60 As a result, he had been transferred from his job, as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed forces to become Minister of Defense, which was less 
important job at that time. 
F. SUHARTO’S RE ELECTION 
In March 1998 Indonesia’s 1,000-member People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) re-elected President Suharto and chose B.J. Habibie as the vice president. The 
nation’s three recognized political parties and the military nominated only Habibie, 
Suharto’s choice. “The fact that Mr. Habibie is the one and only nominee for vice 
president indicates very, very strongly that Suharto is sill in control of the whole 
Indonesian politics,” said Amien Rais, a Muslim leader in the predominantly Muslim 
country. As for Suharto, he was the only candidate for the presidency, and he had 
Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, (New York: Routledge, 1994), pages 152- 59 
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directly or indirectly appointed every member of the MPR. “In the last 30 years, 
Indonesians have lost their basic courage and that is to say no. They are like ducks,” said 
political analyst Loekman Sutrisno about the MPR members. Suharto had no 
challengers, because the assembly was built mostly of Suharto family members and 
cronies and they had been placed under a tightly controlled political system created by 
Suharto.6’ 
G. SUHARTO STEPS DOWN 
When Indonesia was hit by crisis in July 1997, Indonesia sought aid from the 
IMF. Then, World Bank pledged US$4.5 billion for a 3-year program and IMF approved 
a $1 O-billion loan as part of the international package. However, the Indonesian 
currency, the Rupiah, continued to plunge from 2500 to the US dollar before the crisis 
until it hit 16,000 for a US dollar in February 1998. The financial crisis devastated 
Indonesia’s economy and triggered a political firestorm, with riots growing in number 
and angered residents shifting blame onto President Suharto’s regime. Police and 
soldiers were called out on the island of Sulawesi and eastern Java to put down riots 
protesting higher food and fuel prices. The steep drop triggered a crisis of confidence that 
quickly spread beyond economics to politics. Daily demonstrations called for Suharto to 
step down at the end of his term in March 1998. 
After Suharto was elected for his seventh 5-year presidential term, a new cabinet 
was announced, which included his daughter, “Tutut,” and several close businesses 
“Indonesian assembly set to re-elect Suharto, His choice for V.P. is controversial,” CNN Interactive, 61 
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associates. These announcements showed that Suharto did not understand the political 
aspects, but thought the crisis hit Indonesia purely because of economic matters. 
There were several incidents that led up to Suharto’s resignation: On May 12, six 
students and a dozen others were injured in student demonstrations in Trisakti University, 
Jakarta. As the result, on May 13-15 riots spread in Jakarta, with an estimated 1180 dead. 
On May 18 People’s Consultative Assembly Speaker Harmoko called on Suharto to 
resign. Gen. Wiranto, Commander in Chief of the armed forcesklinister of Defense and 
security, called it an “illegal” request and he said that it was an individual announcement, 
and objected to the D P W P R  press release. On May 19 Suharto delivered a speech 
pledging to step down after appointing a special reform council to draft new laws for 
parliamentary elections. At the same time, students took over the parliamentary complex 
and remained in there for three nights. On May 20, 14 individuals, led by coordinating 
Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industry Ginanjar Kartasasmita, refused 
appointment as ministers in a restructured cabinet. 
On May 21, 1998, Suharto announced his resignation and his Vice President, B.J. 
Habibie, replaced him. Immediately after his resignation and the inauguration of the new 
President, General Wiranto pledged military support of Habibie and vowed to protect 
Suharto and his family. Habibie tried to work fast to respond to the students’ and 
peoples’ demands, and he announced a new cabinet. Suharto’s daughter “Tutut” and 
crony “Bob” Hasan were both dropped; Ginandjar retained his position as Coordinating 
Minister for Economy, and Wiranto remained as Minister of Defense. But the opposition 
and students were not satisfied yet. They considered that Habibie only led a transitional 
government and they asked for an early election, which could bring reformation and 
transition to democracy. Finally, Habibie announced that fresh elections would be held 
in 1999.62 
62 “Key Events of the Indonesian Crisis,” The World Bank Group, available at 
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VI. REFORMATION ERA AND NEW MILITARY PARADIGM 
On 22 October 1999, the People’s consultative assembly (MPR), which members 
came from the first free and democratic election in 32 years, chose Abdurrahman Wahid 
to become the fourth President of the Indonesian Republic. The assembly also chose 
Megawati to become Vice President. They will serve the country for a 5-year term. Both 
persons were well known as fighters for democracy and came from the sidelined groups 
that had experienced hard times in the Suharto era. 
The composition of the cabinet of President Abdurahman Wahid showed his 
effort to accommodate the parties that have significant numbers of its members in 
parliament. There are 35 ministers, including the attorney general and the Commander in 
Chief of ABRI/TNI. Beside the parties’ interests, Wahid also considered regional and 
military interests. There are four active officers and one retired officer in five ministerial 
positions, besides the position of Commander in Chief itself, which has equal power with 
other ministers. 
A. NEWPARADIGM 
As a consequence of the reformation, as Indonesians refer to democratization, 
ABRI had to change its doctrine. Some of ABRI’s officers became demoralized, but some 
of them, who represented the reformist wing, had the opportunity to formulate new 
guidelines for ABRI’s approach to reform. The most important task was to prevent the 
military’s involvement in day to day politics and to establish a right and proper civil- 
military relationship in Indonesia. In July 1999, the Commander in Chief, General 
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Wiranto, announced ABRI’s new paradigm, and in September, a seminar was held in 
Bandung and attended by most senior officers, as well as prominent retired officers and 
civilians. The new paradigm consisted of four points: 
1. Change positions and methods to one where (ABFU) is not necessarily in the 
forefront. 
2. Change from the concept of occupying to influencing. 
3. Change in the method of influencing from direct to indirect means. 
4. Readiness to engage in political role-sharing (joint decision-making in the case of 
important national and government issues) with other components of the nation. 
In explaining the need for the new paradigm, the officers who attended the 
seminar suggested that ABRI’s social-political role had expanded too much during the 
New Order. The report on the Bandung seminar mentioned that the concept of dual 
function had been unable to anticipate the possibility that the presidency would be held 
by a person from the military who had a the direct position in the command structure. 
This individual was then likely to use his influence over the command structure for his 
own social-political  interest^.^^ 
Such was the case of Suharto: AE3RI became his Trojan Horse and tool for 
securing and defending Suharto’s interests. He could use his position as the ABRI’s 
Supreme Commander, which should have been only a symbolic position, in a very 
powerful manner. 
‘’ “Hasil seminar ABRI: Pada Acara Seminar di Sesko ABRI Bulan September 1998,” TNI-Net, available 
at http://www.abri.mil.id/ 
56 
The deviation and distortion of the dual function concept from its original concept 
brought confusion to society. The people confused dual function with ‘kekaryaan’ 
(placing of ABRI persons in civilian positions) and were concerned that the role allowed 
ABRI to take over proper functions of other institutions, giving priority to its own 
interests and harming the positions of others. This also brought ABRI to neglect its own 
main responsibilities. The report from the seminar suggest that ‘kekaryaan’ role of ABRI 
would change as ABRI emphasized indirect influence rather than direct occupation of 
positions in civil administration. In the past, AI3RI members were placed in civilian 
positions because of a vacuum in civilian bureaucratic leadership, but this led to friction 
and discontent with civilians. In the hture, the placing of ABRI personnel in positions 
outside ABRI would be on the basis of capacity and capability. Military officers in 
bureaucratic positions would no longer be representatives of the ABRI as an institution, 
but simply the best man for the job. In the future, one of ABRI’s tasks would be to 
actively participate in developing democracy and bringing Indonesian society toward a 
civil society in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Const i t~t ion.~~ 
B. PROBLEMS OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
Dr Kusnanto Anggoro and Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, political observers, gave their 
opinion in the discussion held by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Jakarta, February 1 Oth 2000, that the civil-military relationship of Indonesia is still based 
on suspicion. To stabilize the relationship, this has to end. According to Bhakti, distrust 
between civilians and the military could be observed since the beginning of the 
64 Media Indonesia, 12 November 1998. 
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democratic parliamentary system in 1950s until present. After Suharto stepped down, a 
tendency of civilian retaliation towards the military began to appear. As an example, 
Ikrar pointed to parliamentary examination of the military budget, which is needed by 
TNI to carry out its function of defense and has not been a popular issue recently. 
Civilians have a suspicion that the increase of military budget will be used to kill, abduct, 
and hurt people.65 
According to Kusnanto, civil society in Indonesia wants to expedite civilian 
supremacy over the nation’s institutions. However, neither civilians nor the military are 
prepared to work and find the best solution to make it happen. Within the military there 
is no clarity regarding the future of ‘Dual Function’. On the other hand, there are not 
enough civilian personnel who have sufficient expertise to deal with defense and military 
matters. Thus, building mutual trust between civilian and military is the most important 
task at this moment. The definition of civilian supremacy in Indonesia has deviated, 
because it is only used to justify retaliation by civilians towards the military. Actually, 
civilian supremacy is based on civil rights, and it is not only for civilians. The military as 
a person has civil rights as well, such as right of religion, right to vote in elections, and 
obeying the law.66 
In his first one hundred days, Wahid’s government, which had been established in 
the most democratic process in Indonesia since 1945, made its move in initiating civilian 
control over the military. Wahid’s policy of supporting Indonesia’s Commission of 
Inquiry on human rights violation in East Timor after the referendum (KPP HAM Timor) 
“Penggantian Pejabat TNI oleh Presiden Cermin Pertarungan Otoritas dalam Hubungan Sipil-Militer,” 65 
Kompas Online, available at http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetaW000 111 5/nasional/cem03 .htm 
66 Ibid. 
was one example. Moreover, he asked his Coordinating Minister of political and security 
affairs, General Wiranto, to resign temporarily as a consequence of the investigation. 
Some observers considered that Wahid’s direct appointment of some high-ranking 
officers to fill ABRUTNI leadership positions was inappropriate civilian involvement in 
military affairs. However, it is understandable if that involvement is for the sake of 
reformation and democracy in a transitional era.67 
TNI, the new name of ABRI after the reformation era and after the police were 
split off, has realized the importance of civilian supremacy over the military after more 
countries in the region, in which its military play an important role, have implemented it. 
The obedience of the military to President Wahid was not only because of his efforts, but 
was also a result of the Suharto era. As we can see from the previous chapter, the 
military was not capable of challenging Suharto. He was ABRI’s Supreme Commander, 
and they could not do anything except to obey his orders. In the Wahid era, the military’s 
obedient behavior has continued. This reflected in the statement of Territorial Chief of 
Staff, Lieutenant General Agus Widjoyo, who said that the President, as TNI’s Supreme 
Commander, has powers limited only to national defense policy. Thus, the President 
should not use his authority over TNI for his own political agenda, as is written in section 
10 of the 1945 Constitution. If the ruler uses TNI for his personal power and personal 
political purposes, then in would be considered as a violation of the constitution. On the 
other hand, TNI has to obey the legitimate elected government.68 
“Satu-satunya Inovasi Gus Dur: Supremasi Sipil atas Militer,” Kompas Online, available at 





C. CURRENT SITUATION 
In April 2000, TNI held a conference among its leaders, which is a routine 
activity every year, to consult about the situations that would challenge the organization 
in the future. The conference was held in TNI’s headquarters, Cilangkap. 146 TNI 
officers were involved. The conference had several speakers such as Minister of 
Defense, Minister of Finance, Minister of State, State Minister of Region Autonomy, 
State Minister of Human Rights, and Chief of National Police. Within the TNI, the 
Commander in Chief and all of the Chiefs of Staff gave speeches. The conference 
produced a progressive decision to eliminate TNI’s social-political role and its security 
hnction, which had become TNI’s role for decades. It was considered a progressive 
decision because it gave a clear answer that the dual function concept was eliminated. 
This diminished the hesitation that many civilians’ felt about the sincerity of the military 
in leaving its social-political role. Thus, TNI was successful in leaving its practical role 
in politics through its own internal reforms. However, there are still some problems left. 
For example, the House of Representatives (DPR) has to change the laws that guarantee 
the military seats in ~a r l i amen t .~~  
A good civil military relation for Indonesia is one that differentiates the role and 
function of military and non-military institutions. The President, as the head of the 
nation, has the authority over the military, especially during mobilization of troops, 
through the Minister of Defense and the Commander in Chief. But, during the 
peacetime, intervention from the President had to be limited in order to maintain 
professionalism. Currently, there is still intervention from the President in the 
69 Media Indonesia - headline news, 23 April 2000. 
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assignment of high-ranking officers. Moreover, TNI has not left its social political role 
yet. There are still thirty-eight officers that represent the military in the House of 
Representatives, and ten percent of the regional Representatives are military. This means 
that democratic civil-military relations have not yet been achieved. 
Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, TNI as an institution has undertaken some 
reforms. These have been facilitated by several appointments of higher ranking officers 
who would accept reforms. There are also officers who are against reformation but most 
of them keep quiet. Some of these officers are more worried about their family’s welfare 
than opposing reform.70 
President Abdurrahman Wahid dismissed General Wiranto on 14 February 2000 
after an official inquiry linked the officer to mass violence last year in East Timor. 
Earlier that day, an Indonesian inquiry recommended that six generals, including former 
military chief Wiranto, face possible prosecution over the violence that erupted after East 
Timor voted for independence from Indonesia last August. At that time, Wiranto served 
as Wahid’s Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. Wahid signed a 
decree retiring Wiranto and three other military officers in his cabinet from the armed 
forces, with effect on March 3 1,2000. Other generals included the former head of the 
Bali-based Udayana military command, which oversaw East-Timor under Indonesian 
rule, and the former head of military intelligence for East Timor. The other three were 
former military commanders of East Timor and the former police chief.” These actions 
70 “Hubungan Sipil dan Militer Diwarnai Aksi Balas Dendam,” Kompas Online, available at 
http://www. kompas.comlkompas-cetak/O002/11 /nasional/hubu06. htm 
7’  Chris McCall, Indonesia‘s President Wahid to Fire General, Reuters, Monday January 31 9:46 AM ET, 
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against powerful military leaders show that President Wahid has been able to develop 
some degree of control over the armed forces. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Karen L. Remmer, in her book, Military Rule in Latin America, wrote: “Three 
decades of research have yielded little beyond a set of truisms. One truism is that the 
military acts to protect its institutional interests.” If this was the case in Indonesia today, 
we would expect the military to dominate the policy making process to defend its 
interests. Many have also argued that the type of authoritarian regime influences the 
chances for success of a new democracy. If Indonesia was a military regime under 
Suharto, we would expect a high degree of military resistance to democracy, particularly 
in the areas of defense policy and human rights. 
A. SUMMARY 
Looking back at the history of Indonesia, there has been the important role of 
ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Armed Forces, in the 
struggle for freedom and the nation building. The failure of the coup by Indonesia 
Communist Party ( P a )  on the 30th September made it possible for Suharto to 
successfully introduce a formal the social-political role of the military 1965- 1978 known 
as the era of military superiority. The military became deeply involved in social and 
political matters including implementation of ‘Dual Function,’ this also strengthened the 
economical and political position of Suharto and sustained his regime. 
ABRI became a central actor in government until 1978. However, between 1978 
and mid 1980s, the disagreement arose between the military and Suharto resulting in the 
marginalization of the military power as an institution. ABRI lost its authority and 
became a power tool for Suharto’s regime. The role of pioneering in the development of 
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nation finished. Suharto increasingly civilianized his formerly military regime. The 
military lost whatever independence it might have exercised before. By the end of his 
regime, Suharto presided over a civilian authoritarian regime. 
When the pressure from military reformers and their ABRI sympathizers 
increased in 1990s, Suharto began to remobilize people by approaching Moslem 
organizations to assure his position, knowing that these organizations had loyal and 
strong masses support. These actions certainly made the military uncomfortable, since 
they feared politicizing Indonesia’s Moslem society. Suharto still controlled the military 
through patronage loyalties among some officers. Those who had successful military 
careers came from certain positions such as adjutant or presidential guard, positions that 
were near the president. 
The economic crisis of 1997-1998 triggered political reformation and a transition 
to democracy. Suharto was forced to step down and B.J. Habibie, the civilian vice 
president, which Suharto chose in the last election, was his replacement. General 
Wiranto, Commander in Chief ABIU, pledged military support for Habibie and vowed to 
protect Suharto and family. Under popular pressure for reformation, Habibie act more 
democratically, although his decision on East Timor belied his authoritarian intentions. 
People were not satisfied with the new civilian president, and they considered the Habibie 
government as transitional. In the late 1998 people began to demand early elections, 
which could bring the reformation to completion. 
In the coming election, Habibie nominated himself for president and Wiranto as 
his vice president. But General Wiranto declined to team up with Habibie, giving the 
reason that his mission and duty was to remain neutral military man for the good of the 
country. 
President BJ Habibie’s speech in front of parliament on 19‘h October 1999 
seeking reelection was rejected with 355 votes. The reasons for rejection were that 
Habibie had ignored the parliamentary bill (Tap MPR) on East Timor integration, failed 
to maintain national unity, was incapable of implementing a parliamentary bill against 
corruption, had tolerated cronyism and nepotism, and his inability to distance himself 
from status quo regime. On the following day, Habibie resigned as a presidential 
candidacy. 
On 20th October 1999, in general assembly session, Abdurrahman Wahid was 
elected as Indonesians 4‘h president for 1999 - 2004 with 373 of 6 19 votes. The 
following day, Megawati was elected as vice president. 
B. DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA 
In a transition to democracy, there are usually pacts between hard liners and 
moderates. Theses transitions usually involve a pact between the regime moderates and 
the opposition moderates who also represent their respective hard liners. Indonesia, 
which had a sultanistic type of government under Suharto, did not have a negotiated or 
pacted solution available as a transition path because of the absence of moderates. 
Moreover, there were no important figures who had any authority to lead the process for 
the transition in the regime, other than Suharto himself. “The immediate implications of 
a sultanistic regime for democracy are they will have begun the construction of civil 
society, and constitutionalism and a rule of law, professional norms of the bureaucracy, 
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economic society, and political institutions from every le~eI.”~*Jn a sultanistic regime the 
opportunity for democratic transition come because a ruler is overthrown or assassinated, 
which might lead to the dynamics of provisional government and cause an early free 
election. This was the situation in Indonesia in 1997-98. The transition happened 
because of the sudden collapse of the non-democratic regime,73 and it rapidly led to new 
elections. This meant: 
1. Concentration of Power under Suharto 
General Suharto was able to consolidate military power under his command 
between 1965 and 1985. With resulting centralization of power, the military was able to 
implement any kind of order from the authoritarian ruler. Suharto proved that he was in 
full control of the military by ignoring them, even starting to civilize his government and 
put only military loyalists in important positions rather than military professionals. 
2. Rapid Transition 
The military was not able to avoid the transition. In fact, they became the victim 
and main target of the reformation movement. This happened because Suharto had 
already subordinated the military and built his own civilian authoritarian regime. The 
military did not have any power other than what Suharto allowed. This situation enabled 
a quick transition to democracy. 
3. Civil-Military Problems 
The sudden collapse of authoritarian regime left a number of problems. One of 
the government systems that needs reform is the civil military relationship. This 
72 Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996, p56. 
l3 Ibid., pages 70-7 1 
relationship was once handled by Suharto himself. He gave guidance on all military 
matters, including the budget, organization, promotions, and doctrine. Establishing new 
mechanisms to handle these matters in a democratic and efficient manner is one of the 
main challenges facing Indonesia. 
C. FUTURE DIRECTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA 
Following the transition to democracy, President Wahid has followed a policy of 
slowly eliminating military privileges and autonomy. Even though this policy has 
prevented overt military resistance, the new regime faces several challenges to 
establishing democratic civil-military relations. 
1. Human Rights abuses 
President Wahid dismissed General Wiranto on 14 February 2000 after an official 
inquiry linked the officer to mass violence last year in East Timor. Earlier on the same 
day, an Indonesian board of inquiry recommended that six generals, including former 
Commander in Chief Wiranto, face possible prosecution over the violence that erupted 
after East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia last August. The panel found 
evidence of mass killings and torture as well as attempts to tamper with evidence by 
removing bodies from graves in East Timor, which Indonesia invaded in 1975 and ruled 
in defiance of widespread local opposition until last year. The military has reason to be 
concerned, because if the probe into East Timor atrocities continues, they will either be 
investigated or indicted in domestic Indonesian trials. Or if they leave the country as 
some officers have, they will face a stricter trial abroad. If they try to stage a coup, it is 
too late, because now they have neither the support from the public nor within their own 
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ranks.74 President Wahid is expected to apply his formula of forgiveness to quell the 
military’s desire to rebel. Primarily, he wants to avoid bloodshed. As a result, the 
military as a political force will be severely weakened. If the Indonesian authorities wish 
to spare the nation international embarrassment, then they must live up to their own 
responsibilities in bringing these people to justice in Indonesia. 
2. Institutionalizing Civilian Control 
TNI accepted a civilian as Minister of Defense, because it thought that the civilian 
would help protect the military in the future. Although Juwono, the new civilian Minister 
of Defense has worked as ABRI’s Vice Governor of National Defense Institutes 
(Lemhanas), he is not a military man and will not go to extreme lengths to protect the 
position of the military. One of the most important issues facing the new minister is 
eliminating TNI’s role in the economy and securing state financing for the military 
budget. This is an entirely new phenomenon in Indonesian civil-military relations. It is 
not only a matter of TNI accepting this changes, but it also has to address the civilian 
government’s willingness to fund a budget of considerable proportions. 
3. Military Factionalization 
Admiral Widodo was chosen to be commander of the armed forces, 26‘h October 
1999, which opened a new chapter in TNI history commenced. Now, the commander of 
the armed forces is a naval officer who has no particular interest in defending the Army. 
The promotion of Adm. Widodo has been popular among civilians since the Indonesian 
Navy has been recognized as force interested in dialog~e.’~ The Air Force is also 
 
, 
distancing itself from Suharto by unearthing doubts about the 30th of September coup in 
1965. In April 1999, Air Force commander, Marshal Hanafi Asnan, supported the efforts 
by Air Force retired officers to correct history regarding the infiltration of communists in 
the service just before 30th of September coup in 1965.76 This shows that the transition 
to democracy has fragmented TNI. 
4. Changing Military Doctrine 
The Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) has said farewell to its role in society and 
~ 
politics, the cause of many problems in the past. Today, TNI states that it will concentrate 
on matters of defense alone. TNI Chief Commander, Admiral Widodo AS, declared this 
at the annual TNI Leaders Summit 2000. TNI is also no longer hlly responsible for 
security. This has become a police responsibility. This is a significant change compared 
with the situation of the armed forces in the past. As Admiral Widodo said, the TNI 
summit also stressed commitment and consistency in matters of internal reform. The 
problem now is how to eliminate the remnants of the dual role that has permeated the 
armed forces’ doctrine. TNI is in the process of leaving its dual role today. But not every 
dual trend has been eliminated. The TNI doctrine still contains elements of ‘dual 
function.’ There still are Territorial Commandos, Military District Commandos, and 
other internal security forces in the military. Admiral Widodo AS also added that while 
waiting for National Defense and Security (Hankamneg) bill revision, TNI would 
conduct six functions.77 
1. To prevent enemy aggression. 
“KSAU Dukung Pelurusan Sejarah,” Kompas Online, available at http:/lwww.kompas.comlkompas- 






2. To train people for national defense duties. 
3. To be in charge of the law of the sea and air of Indonesian. 
4. To help police in their duties, especially in anti-terrorism and countering 
armed rebellion. 
To help government duty in maintaining national defense and consolidate 
nation unity, to overcome nature disaster, to prepare non TNI components for 
the purpose of national defense and other social problems. 
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